Classroom experiments examining fairness preferences [Andreoni, J., Miller, J., 2002 . Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of preferences for Altruism. Econometrica 70 (2), 737-753] were conducted to examine two issues: first, are classroom points a salient reward medium (comparable to cash in research experiments)? Secondly, does experiment timing during the semester influence results. Subject choices are consistent with the existence of well-behaved utility functions, indicating that points experiments can be valid. Secondly, subjects are more likely to be "selfish" when the experiment is conducted early rather than late in the academic semester. This result has behavioral implications for environments where nonmonetary incentives prevail, as well as implications for the growing number of instructors using experiments and follow-up discussion in the classroom.
Introduction
Experimental economics has proven quite useful as a pedagogical tool. Not only can classroom experiments be enjoyable for both students and instructors, but there is also evidence indicating that experiments can improve student comprehension of important economics concepts ( [Frank, 1997] , [Emerson and Taylor, 2004] and [Durham et al., 2007] ). Many instructors who conduct classroom experiments use class points (or extra credit points) as the reward medium,1 and these instructors often discuss related results from the experimental economics literature. It is therefore important to know if predictable differences exist between comparable research (i.e., cash) and classroom (i.e., extra credit) experiments, and such differences are relatively understudied.
From a pedagogical standpoint, this article does not argue that one should conduct experiments only at one particular point in the semester. Rather, the secondary objective of this paper is to highlight how experiment timing during the semester can significantly alter experimental results. Students should be made aware of how experiment timing may alter results, and this can be exploited as an opportunity to compare/contrast experimental results.
The purpose of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive comparison of lab experiments and comparable classroom experiments. Rather, this paper presents the results from classroom experiments conducted using the well-known Andreoni and Miller (2002) design to examine preferences for altruism. Because their experiment examines a general issue of "fairness" preferences, it not only has significant behavioral appeal, but the topic can also be of significant interest in a typical economics principles class where students often think that economists assume only money matters. Of course, economists realize that this is not true, as evidenced by the often-mentioned trade-off between equity and efficiency in microeconomics principles. An experiment about fairness issues can, however, be quite useful for highlighting recent findings from economics research.5 Andreoni and Miller's (2002) cash reward experiments are replicated for comparison to classroom data generated using extra credit points as the reward medium. The classroom experiment is then conducted either early or late in the semester to examine experiment timing. Subject rationality (as determined by the data's consistency with the weak axiom of revealed preference, or WARP) is explored and found not to be significantly different in the classroom credit experiment compared to the cash experiments-this indicates that points constitute a salient reward medium. The cash experiment replication generates data showing similar proportions of selfish subjects, on average, to what Andreoni and Miller (2002) report-about 43% of our data are best described by a selfish-type utility function compared to 47% of their subjects (not statistically different).6 However, the classroom experiment results significantly differ based on experiment timing. Early in the semester the experiment generates 50% selfish subjects, compared to only 26% selfish subjects when the exact same experiment is conducted late in the semester (in different classes). Taken together, these data provide both important evidence in support of subject rationality in nonmonetary reward experiments and unique evidence that experiment timing can affect classroom experiment results.
The reward medium for classroom experiments
Most discussion of the reward medium in classroom experiments focuses on the proper or fair way to provide salient incentives. Some teachers offer a small cash incentive to students in their classroom experiments. For example, one might offer a small cash payoff to the high payoff outcome in the experiment, or one might offer some cash incentives by paying all subjects a small fraction of their experimental earnings (e.g., Holt, 1999) . A natural alternative for those who desire a non-hypothetical decision environment is to offer some type of class points payoff. Considerable concern has been expressed over the "fairness" of affecting grades with experiments. Commentary in Fels (1993), and Williams and Walker (1993) leans towards continued use of extra credit points if their maximum effect on a student's grade remains relatively small (e.g., no more than one full letter grade). Some experiments contain a random element to outcomes, and there are those who find this inherently unfair (e.g., Stodder, 1998) , while others find it quite parallel to how outcomes are sometime determined in the "real world" (e.g., Bell, 1993) . Though I do not necessarily recommend it, offering regular class points based on experiment outcomes is another alternative. Depending on the instructor, the use of regular points versus extra credit points may have little practical effect on the final grading scale, but the idea of having regular points determined from outcomes is seen as less procedurally fair by students.7 It is important to note that my use of extra credit points for the experiments reported here was such that subject payoffs from the experiments could only improve one's grade. As such, even a zero payoff from the extra credit points experiment would not lower a student's grade below that which followed from performance on other course requirements.
The debate surrounding the use of class points will not abate, and it is not my purpose to convert anyone to the use of extra credit points as the reward medium for class experiments. But, because there is a large community of instructors who do use class points as a reward, the first question for this paper is whether or not the reward medium matters in terms of experimental outcomes. Presumably, the answer to this question is of interest both to those who actively practice the use of class points experiments as well as those who have a general interest in the potential significance of the chosen reward medium for an experiment. Isaac et al. (1994) conclude that results from their large-group public goods experiments are similar using class points or money incentives. However, control over this variable was not present in their study, given that the reward medium effect was not the objective of their research. , in an unpublished study, conducts a controlled comparison of the reward medium effect of cash versus extra credit points in public goods experiments and finds no significant difference in the data on several outcome measures.
The limited amount of existing research on this issue should not be taken to imply that the reward medium used in an experiment does not matter. The present results are important in that they indicate that the timing of the experiment can confound the measurement of a reward medium effect. Indeed, the data show that, in the Andreoni and Miller (2002) experiments that I replicate, one set of classroom points data is statistically no different from the cash experiment replication, while the other generates significantly different levels of altruism (or selfishness) from the subjects.
The experiments
The design is motivated by the classical dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1988) . Two subjects are paired, and one subject is allowed to divide a monetary pie between the two in any way he/she likes-the counterpart has no choice but to accept the allocation. Removing the opportunity for the counterpart to respond by rejecting the offer is meant to remove fear of rejection from the allocation decisions so that what remains is a more accurate measure of the subject's preference towards fairness. Andreoni and Miller, 2002 (168) Andreoni and Miller (2002) expand on the dictator game design by varying the "price" of giving away $1.00 from $.25 to $4.00. For example, if the price of giving away $1 is $2, this means that forgoing each $1 of payoff for yourself generates $.50 of payoff for your counterpart (in the prototypical dictator game, the price of giving away $1 is simply $1 less for yourself). Subjects make a series of 11 token allocation decisions designed to alter the price of giving (see Appendix A for the allocation decisions of the cash replication experiment. An additional appendix containing all instructions is available upon request). A standard dictator game is one in which the slope of the budget constraint in payoff-to-self/payoff-to-other space is negative one. The series of 11 token decisions, where each allocation decision is based on a distinct budget constraint in the ownpayoff/other-payoff space, represent a mix of standard dictator games as well as allocation environments where the price of giving is greater or less than 1. Because the subject choice problem can be described in terms of budget-constrained choice bundles, revealed preference axioms can be used to examine consistency of preferences (i.e., rationality of choice). The game is simple to understand, yet foundational to many more complicated real-world decision environments. Fig. 1 gives an example of 3 of the 11 budget constraints from the Andreoni and Miller (2002) design used in the present experiments.
Fig. 1. Sample budget constraints for allocation experiment.
After making all 11 allocation decisions, each subject's decision sheet is randomly matched with those of two other anonymous subjects. During the first pairing of decision sheets, one subject has a randomly selected allocation decision chosen, and the subject earns the amount determined by that subject's own "hold" decision. The earnings from the first pairing are placed into the subject's payoff envelope by an experimenter. The decision sheets are then re-matched such that each subject is matched with a different subject, and this time those subjects who had earnings determined by their own randomly chosen "hold" decision received earnings based on the another subject's "pass" decision for another randomly chosen allocation decision (and vice versa). In this way, each subject had one payoff determined by one of their own "hold" decisions, and one payoff determined by someone else's "pass" decision. This was common knowledge, as was the fact that no subject would be matched twice with the same person, and that decisions would remain double-blind anonymous.8 Decision sheet pairings, random allocation choices, and envelope stuffing were always supervised by a compensated volunteer subject who did not take part in the decision-making portion of the experiment. The cash experiments did not involve students from my classes, and a given experiment group in the cash experiment was not a group of student classmates as in the points experiments.
The points experiment is identical to the procedures of the Cash experiment, with the exception that payoffs were in terms of class points that would be added to the student's Exam #1 (with no truncation at 100%). Whereas the average payoff in the cash experiments was about $15 (for a 30 min experiment), the average payoff in the points experiments was 9 class points. This amount of points was nearly a full grade on the 100-point Exam #1, and in total this average payoff amounted to 2% of the final class points amount (450). With the plus-minus grading system, this implies that the average amount of class points paid out for this experiment was small, but non-trivial.9 Over the course of a 16-week semester, this class points experiment was conducted in some classes in week 3 of the semester (the Early Points treatment), while in distinct classes it was conducted in week 14 (the Late Points treatment). The students had not yet completed Exam #1 in week 3, whereas all graded items except for the final exam had been completed in week 14 of the semester. All points experiments were conducted during regularly scheduled class sessions of my microeconomic principles classes -a required business class with varied student representation -and I personally conducted all experiments. To the extent that "experiment days" were preannounced, without revealing the topic or experiment details, participation is voluntary if students choose not to come. They were, however, aware that this experiment day would afford them the opportunity to earn some extra credit points.
Results
Two outcome measures are reported in order to compare the points experiments with the cash experiments, as well as for comparison with Andreoni and Miller (2002) , who first focus on whether preferences for fairness are "rational". So, subject rationality is initially examined in Table 1 . The data are analyzed in terms of their consistency with the WARP, consistency with which implies that the subjects' revealed preferences could be rationalized by some well-behaved utility function.10 The data in Andreoni and Miller (2002) are examined for their consistency with other revealed preference axioms, but the conclusions are not significantly altered if one focuses only on WARP violations. Importantly, there is no reason that data would abide by WARP if the classroom points incentives are not salient to the subjects, and so subject consistency with WARP will help indicate legitimacy of the nonmonetary incentives. The data in Table 1 report the number of violations of WARP at Afriat's (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) of .95. The CCEI is a measure of how much a budget constraint would have to shrink to avoid the preference axiom violation, and so the threshold CCEI of .95 allows for the small amount of decision error of the magnitude suggested by Varian (1991) and reported in the Andreoni and Miller (2002) The data in Table 1 indicate that subjects, in all treatments, are mostly rational in the sense that choices are consistent with revealed preference theory. Though somewhat more subject choices violate WARP in the present data (12-17%) than in Andreoni and Miller data (1.7%), it is still the case that the vast majority of subject choices are consistent with WARP. Rationality is not affected in the class points experiments by early versus late experiment timing (p > .10 for the binomial test). 11 There are no significant differences in subject rationality in comparing the Cash treatment with either of the class points treatments (p > .10). In sum, while the present data show relatively more frequent violations of rationality than in Andreoni and Miller (2002) , choices are still over 80% rational across all treatments, with no significant differences across our Cash and Points treatments. In short, these data support the notion that classroom points can be a salient and valid reward medium for economics experiments.
For further comparison to Andreoni and Miller, preferences are categorized. Data consistent with WARP (i.e., "rational" subjects) merely imply that revealed preferences are justifiable by some well-behaved utility function. Andreoni and Miller examine three well-behaved preference types that are of particular interest: Homo economicus subjects (selfish), Rawlsian subjects (i.e., Leontief preferences), or Utilitarian subjects (i.e., perfect substitute preferences). Table 2 shows the results from a categorization of preferences for self-payoff, x s , and other-payoff, x o , into one of these three types: selfish type (U = x s ), Leontief preferences (U = min{x s , x o }), or Utilitarian preferences (U = x s + x o ). While the data can certainly be examined for consistency with other well-behaved utility functions, these three offer obvious benefits. Their variety includes preference types often considered in undergraduate economics class (at least in intermediate and advanced microeconomics courses). And, the distinct predictions of each of these utility functions makes it easy to examine differences across experiments. Table 2 . Categorizing subject preferences (percentage of subjects fitting weak and strong forms of preference type)
Andreoni and Miller examine both a strong and weak preference classification for each category, depending on whether choices exactly match those required by their respective utility function. A weak preference classification simply means that subject choices are closer to those from one of the three utility functions than to either of the other two. For example, a subject facing the budget constraint 40 = xs + (1/3)xo who passes 30 tokens (and keeps 10) most closely matches the Utilitarian subject type for that decision. A strong Utilitarian type would pass all 40 tokens, a Leontief subject would pass 10 tokens, and a selfish subject would pass none. In what follows, I examine choices that do not exactly match these prototypical preferences by calculating the minimum sum of squared deviations of the subject's tokens "held" amount for all allocation decisions from the amounts that one would hold for either of these three preference types.12 The preference type that minimizes this sum of squared deviations is the subject's "weak" preference type. This comparison has the benefit of categorizing all subjects into one of these three categories, but it has the drawback of not differentiating between cases where a subject is relatively closer to a given preference type. The portion of subjects exactly fitting one of these three utility functions (i.e., the "strong" preference types, 16-26%) is somewhat less than reported in the Andreoni and Miller, 2002 J. Andreoni and J. Miller, Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism, Econometrica 70 (2) (2002) Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
data (43%).
The results from strong or weak preference type categorizations, which are shaded in Table 2 , highlight a main result from of this paper. A large majority of the subjects are classified into selfish or Leontief preference types. Subjects are somewhat less selfish in the Cash experiment than what Andreoni and Miller (2002) report, but the difference is not statistically significant (p > .10 for the binomial test of whether our proportion of selfish subjects matches theirs (47%)).
In examining the class points experiments, the data show that subjects are somewhat more selfish, less Rawlsian (i.e., Leontief preferences), and less Utilitarian (i.e., substitute preference) for early-insemester experiments relative to late-in-semester experiments. That is, the distribution of preference types (weak or strong) for the classroom experiment is more similar to the Cash experiment when conducted early in the semester, but quite different when the points experiment is conducted late in the semester. This result is consistent with what one would conclude from examining the subset of class points data from the more familiar dictator game budget sets (budget sets 6, 7, and 9) . Dictator offers are significantly higher late in the semester versus early in the semester for the points experiments (p = .00 for the two-sample test of mean differences in dictator offers). Of course, there is no theoretical reason that subjects should be more selfish early versus late in the semester in these points experiments.
Thus, there are two main results: first, classroom points can be a valid motivator for subjects. Of course, individual subjects will view the reward as more or less salient depending on the value of those points to the subject. This is similar to the issue of wealth effects in cash research experiments, but the reward level is chosen in the present experiments so that virtually every subject can improve his/her final letter grade with the average level of points-payoff in the classroom experiment. The more surprising second result involved experiment timing. Preferences over classroom points change significantly depending on the timing of the experiments during the academic session. So, while points are a salient reward, preferences towards them are not independent of factors that change over the course of the session.
Concluding remarks
The main message from these experiments is simple. Though the results from a classroom experiment using extra credit points as the reward medium may replicate those from a cash experiment equivalent, they may also vary significantly given the timing of the class experiment. The reason results may vary can serve to highlight methodological issues and/or behavioral factors in decision-making. Because potentially important variables may differ over the course of a semester for a given student or classroom, there is a loss of control over certain classroom experiment details with respect to timing within the academic session-a methodological issue. However, I do find a regular pattern to outcome differences early versus late in the semester, at least for this particular experiment. One possible explanation for relatively more selfish behavior early in the semester is that the value of a given number of extra credit points is more uncertain early in the semester than late in the semester. So, risk-averse students will seek to maximize own-points in the uncertain reward environment, resulting in more selfish behavior.
An alternative hypothesis is that a given class of students may form some social bonds later in the semester. If this reduction in social distance generates less selfish behavior (see [Hoffman et al., 1996] and [Cox and Deck, 2005] ), then one would also expect to see less selfish choices for experiments given late in the semester (and perhaps more Rawlsian or egalitarian preferences). However, some students might develop a feeling of greater isolation in the classroom as the session progresses, and so it is not immediately apparent that students will perceive a reduction in social distance among all classmates as the semester progresses. While it seems that one can argue for more or less social distance among subsets of students within a given classroom, the present design cannot properly evaluate the social distance hypothesis.13
In terms of real-world behavioral implications of these hypotheses, a workplace supervisor may exercise some control over the collegiality (i.e., social distance) among her workers, which may combat the uncertain payoffs of a new recognition award system (e.g., employee of the month). Or, an employer may go to extra lengths to clearly communicate the value of such awards to the company so that nonmonetary payoff value is more well-known. The present experiment results suggest that either practice may limit the extent of selfish behavior among workers. So, while additional research would be needed to determine whether the mechanism underlying this classroom timing result is one of uncertainty or social distance (or some other mechanism), this paper is the first to my knowledge to identify this intriguing result.
One potential confound in the classroom data is that students may feel that grades are based on a relative scale (though no grading curve was ever suggested to the students in these classes). If students perceive that their relative standing will affect their grades, then they may be more points-selfish when this perception is strongest, and this would also have behavioral implications in such areas as workplace rewards.14 One might criticize the present experimental design because Cash experiments were not conducted at two points (early versus late) in the semester. While early-and late-Cash treatments may appear to complete a 2 × 2 experimental design matrix, it is unclear what cash early versus late in the semester means. Perhaps a more analogous comparison would be cash early versus late in the month. Expense uncertainties may differ across a given month if one's paycheck of income flow is on a typical monthly cycle. This offers a potentially interesting avenue for future research, but one that was considered tangential to the present study given that the connection between semester points cycles and monthly expense cycles is somewhat speculative-it nevertheless suggests that future research could explore, for example, whether time together as a "group" engenders less selfish behavior within a group (even when decisions remain anonymous). The main objective of the Cash experiment in this paper was to replicate the Andreoni and Miller (2002) design and provide a baseline for comparison. Perhaps experimental economists should examine the potential effects of administering experiments at different points in one's paycheck cycle, but the present examination of experiment timing across a semester had immediate implications for the growing number of economists conducting classroom experiments.
Finally, it is also the case that no controls were implemented to prevent students who already took the Class Points Early experiment from talking to those who later took the experiment (though the same could be said of most experiments using a college student subject pool). If such communication occurs, the preferences may converge upon the early-player majority if subjects tend to follow advice from previous players (one sees such results in Schotter (2003) , and Schotter and Sopher (2007) ). In the present experiments, however, this concern should be minimal because different "generations" of players span several academic semesters. That is, early-points experiments were conducted in one semester, and late-points in a different semester, which decreases the likelihood that such communication occurred to any significant degree, if at all.
Overall, these results are important to those who question the viability of classroom points as a reward medium in experiments-subjects exhibit rational preferences over an important behavioral concept (fairness) when the payoff is in extra credit points. The results also highlight an additional pedagogical point: unanticipated confounds may exist over the course of an academic session, among other things. It would be interesting to extend this exploration of experiment timing effects, both in the classroom and in behavioral research, to a variety of experiments (e.g., individual decision-making, risky choice experiments, trust, etc.) in order to examine whether experiment timing affects outcomes in a variety of decision domains. conducted without knowing the final points payoff for each student, subjects in this cash replication were asked to show their total final payoff (but never their decisions) privately to the experimenter for record-keeping. In this manner, decisions were anonymous both to subjects and to the experimenter, but final payoff outcomes were known to the experiment just as in the class points experiments. This procedural difference did not result in significant differences in the proportion of "selfish" subject classifications, but I find relatively less "Utilitarian" subjects and more "Rawlsian" subjects (as discussed later) in the cash replication compared to Andreoni and Miller. 9 Given differences due to rounding of percentages and grades, it is somewhat complicated to determine exactly how many students' grades were altered by the results of the experiment, but a conservative estimate is that at least 25% of those who took the experiment improved their grades (based on 2% improvement on average, with a range from 0% to 4.5%). More importantly, however, is the subject's belief that their grade might be improved.
